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A Jury Hoax:
The Superpower of
the Opening Statement
by Hans Zeisel
Some years ago, a distinguished federal judge buttonholed
me and said, "I understand you and your friend Kalven found
out that 80 percent of all jury trials are decided right after the
opening statements. It is then that these juries make up their
mind, and never change afterwards." With some embarrassment I answered that this sounded both interesting and important, but that we certainly had made no such discovery.
Similar conversations with other judges and lawyers followed.
I remained baffled until one day the general counsel of a
major corporation handed me a letter, remarking: "He cites
your and Harry Kalven's work in The American Jury... "
And there, in this round-robin letter to prestigious general
counsels of the land, I at last found the attribution, accompanied by the assurance that his law firm devoted particular attention to its opening statements. I asked the letter writer
where he had learned of the discovery; he named three
lawyers. My inquiry with these three lawyers was not successful. Each, in effect, answered: "Sorry, I never made such
a statement."
I lost interest in the affair until my good friend Thomas
Sullivan told me that at the recent conference of the American Trial Lawyers Association, the "discovery" was presented as one of the few dogmas of good trial tactic. Around
that time I also received an inquiry from a lawyer who was
writing a text on trial strategy, asking me for the proper
citation for our discovery.
My friend suggested that through an appropriate statement
I should put an end to the hoax. This, then, is the statement.
First, we never made such a discovery; we never even
asked the question. Nowhere in The American Jury's 438
pages can one even find the words "opening statement."
The most puzzling aspect of the discovery is why it acquired such powerful currency, when a moment's reflection
should have raised all kinds of questions. Even if there had
been data to back the discovery, one should have wondered
about its meaning. Since there were not and are not any data,
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the reaction is even more puzzling. What exactly is the
meaning of the claim?
If it emphasizes the importance of a good opening statement, it adds nothing to what every good trial lawyer knows.
But, if it seriously suggests that a good opening statement
relieves the lawyer or the client of caring about the evidence
and its proper presentation, about the credibility of the witnesses, about the lawyer's own performance, and about the
judge's instructions, because the case has, in fact, been decided--only a feeble-minded lawyer would assent.
Since the so-called discovery was never made, one must
ask: Why do distinguished lawyers and judges continue to
talk about it as if it were one of the few anchor points in trial
strategy?
As a continuing provider of empirical insights into the
legal process, I know that the law world does not exactly
rush to embrace new statistical evidence. What does it mean
that this law world embraced with alacrity a discovery that
was never made and makes little sense? Perhaps it is the
pleasure of having such an anchor point at all. It certainly
allows the burgeoning class of jury consultants to claim
access to the formula for guaranteed victory. Here, for instance, is an excerpt from a recently issued outline composed
by a leading company in the field:
Research indicates lawyers win or lose a case with the
opening statement....
Many jurors come to a decision during or immediately
after the opening statement.
Lawyers or judges may be forgiven for misquoting research. A research company cannot aspire to such forgiveness.
In case somebody is tempted to do the research that was
never done, the researcher should consider how difficult it
would be to design research to test the issue. No doubt, if the
researcher could poll juries right after they have heard the
opening statements and compare their tentative verdict with
the one they would ultimately render, the researcher would
obtain considerable correlation.
The crucial question, though, would be whether the jury's
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tentative verdict wasn't based on the promise of superior evidence, a promise then kept in the subsequent trial. To credit
victory in these cases to the opening statement makes no
sense because, more likely than not, it was the weight of the
evidence, properly foreshadowed in the opening statement,
that deserved the credit and not the forensic merits of the
statement. To design research that would separate the effect
of the "foreshadowing" from the effect of the oratory would
be almost impossible. And, if such research could be designed and executed, its yield would be small.
One of the undesirable by-products of the discovery is the
implied diminution of the jury's intelligence and decency, a
by-product that obviously fuels partisans' efforts to abolish
the jury in civil cases. Although there may be arguments for
abolition, jurors' lack of decency and intelligence should not
be among them, because the average jury has both.
Thus, since the discovery was never made and the issue
cannot be tested, and since continuing the claim serves only
to degrade the jury, why not stop peddling the nonsense?
There remains another puzzle: What in The American Jury
misled the original attributor of the hoax into believing we
had dealt with the opening statement?
I had to comb the pages for data that even remotely could
be mistaken for such a commentary on the opening statement. I am reasonably certain that one of our real discoveries, abetted by sloppy reading and sloppy hearsay, was the
source of the misattribution.
Our real discovery, since confirmed by other researchers,
was this: We found that in the great majority of cases, the
jury's decision is, indeed, made long before the final phase
of the decision process. Decision time comes not at the end
of the deliberation process, but at its beginning.
In Chapter 38 we discuss data on the relationship between
the first ballot a jury normally takes shortly after the start of
the deliberation ("to see where we stand") and the jury's
final verdict. Since these data led to a rather important insight into jury behavior, I present them here, together with
the comment that accompanied them in The American Jury:
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FIRST BALLOT AND FINAL VERDICT
Number of Guilty Votes on First Ballot
0
1-5
6
7-11
12
% of Concurrence
with Final Verdict
Not Guilty
100
Hung
Guilty
100%
Total
(26)
# of cases

91
7
2
100%
(41)

50
50
100%
(10)

5
9
86
100
100% 100%
(105)
(43)

If we look first at the third column, we see that where the
jury is split 6-6, the final verdict falls half the time in one
direction and half in the other. Where there is an initial
majority either for conviction or for acquittal, however, the
jury in roughly nine out of 10 cases decides in the direction
of the initial majority. Only with extreme infrequency does
the minority succeed in persuading the majority to change its
mind during the deliberation. But, this is only to say that with
very few exceptions, the first ballot indicates the outcome of
the verdict. And if this is true, then the real decision often is
made before deliberation begins.
The upshot is a radical hunch about the function of the
deliberation process. Perhaps it does not so much decide the
case as bring about the consensus, the outcome of which has
been made highly likely by the distribution of first-ballot
votes. The deliberation process might well be likened to
what the developer does for an exposed film: It brings out the
picture, but the outcome is predetermined.
On this view, the deliberation process offers fascinating
data on human behavior and should reward systematic study.
The topic, however, is not so much how juries decide cases
but how small groups produce consensus. From what we
have been able to perceive thus far, the process is an interesting combination of rational persuasion, sheer social pressure, and the psychological mechanism by which individual
perceptions undergo change when exposed to group discussion.
Our statistics further suggest that reversal of a first ballot
majority will become possible only if the margin of that
majority was small. We, therefore, relegated Henry Fonda's
accomplishment in The Twelve Angry Men to the movie
world. We later found, however, one real case in which such
an improbable reversal took place-when Nixon's cabinet
members John Mitchell and Maurice Stans were tried in
1974 in New York City on a conspiracy charge. Their jury at
one time stood 8 to 4 for conviction, but ultimately acquitted
the defendants. The odds that such a jury would acquit are
around one in 20. That acquittal, too, was the work of one of
the jurors, and the intriguing circumstances that led to it
merely confirm the soundness of the general rule.
The pivotal juror, by such tactics as arranging for the
sequestered jury to use baseball equipment and to see movies
at his bank's headquarters and by inviting his fellow jurors to
see the St. Patrick's Day Parade from one of the bank's
branches, established himself as social director of the jury.
When the critical time came, he, the bank director among a
jury that had no other college-educated members, "explained" to them the true. situation. See Zeisel and Diamond,
"The Jury Selection in the Mitchell-Stans Trial," 1 AmeriD
can Bar FoundationRes. J., 151 + (1976). U
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